Identifying ECUs Using Inimitable Characteristics of Signals in
  Controller Area Networks by Choi, Wonsuk et al.
1Identifying ECUs Using Inimitable Characteristics
of Signals in Controller Area Networks
Wonsuk Choi, Hyo Jin Jo, Samuel Woo, Ji Young Chun, Jooyoung Park, and Dong Hoon Lee ( )
Abstract—In the last several decades, the automotive industry
has come to incorporate the latest Information and Communica-
tions (ICT) technology, increasingly replacing mechanical com-
ponents of vehicles with electronic components. These electronic
control units (ECUs) communicate with each other in an in-
vehicle network that makes the vehicle both safer and easier to
drive. Controller Area Networks (CANs) are the current standard
for such high quality in-vehicle communication. Unfortunately,
however, CANs do not currently offer protection against security
attacks. In particular, they do not allow for message authentica-
tion and hence are open to attacks that replay ECU messages for
malicious purposes. Applying the classic cryptographic method of
message authentication code (MAC) is not feasible since the CAN
data frame is not long enough to include a sufficiently long MAC
to provide effective authentication. In this paper, we propose a
novel identification method, which works in the physical layer
of an in-vehicle CAN network. Our method identifies ECUs
using inimitable characteristics of signals enabling detection of a
compromised or alien ECU being used in a replay attack. Unlike
previous attempts to address security issues in the in-vehicle CAN
network, our method works by simply adding a monitoring unit
to the existing network, making it deployable in current systems
and compliant with required CAN standards. Our experimental
results show that the bit string and classification algorithm that
we utilized yielded more accurate identification of compromised
ECUs than any other method proposed to date. The false positive
rate is more than 2 times lower than the method proposed by
P.-S. Murvay et al. This paper is also the first to identify potential
attack models that systems should be able to detect.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the automotive industry has increasingly
replaced mechanical components of vehicles with electronic
components, using the latest Information and Communica-
tions (ICT) technology. Electronic Control Units (ECUs) were
originally proposed to ensure optimal engine performance,
particularly in terms of efficient gasoline and oil consumption
[23]. More recently, automotive manufactures have installed
ECUs not only for engine control but also to perform various
functions for driver safety and convenience such as Anti-
lock Brake Systems and Intelligent Parking Assist Systems.
Luxury sedans now contain 50-70 independent ECUs [25].
These ECUs form a network to communicate with each other
that is divided into several sub-networks. For example, ECUs
for chassis control are connected with the in-vehicle Controller
Area Network (CAN). The CAN was designed by Robert
Bosch GimbH in 1983 for automotive applications to provide
reliable in-vehicle communication between ECUs [19]. The
CAN’s reliability and simple network structure has made it
the standard for communication as an in-vehicle network for
over 30 years.
Despite the advantages of the CAN, it was not designed with
security features in mind; hence, the network is open to attack
from malicious messages intended to cause malfunctions. In
fact, previous research has analyzed the security features of
modern vehicles and found that the fundamental reason why
the CAN is subject to attack is that it does not support message
authentication [10], [25]. Unfortunately, the existing method
for message authentication cannot be applied to the in-vehicle
CAN network: it is difficult to use message authentication code
(MAC) because there is no field for message authentication
in the CAN data frame. Even if MAC could be transmitted
through the CAN data field, the effectiveness of the network
to authenticate messages would be extremely limited because
the length of the CAN data field is only 1-8 bytes while the
MAC needed for adequate security is more than 20 bytes.
To address this vulnerability, some research has been con-
ducted on message authentication in the in-vehicle CAN
network [20], [27], [38]. However, previous work did not
succeed in solving the fundamental inadequacy of the cur-
rent CAN to incorporate security features: the methods of
previous researchers simply cannot be directly applied into
the current CAN system. Herrewege et al. [38] developed a
CAN+ protocol initially proposed by Ziermann et al. [41],
which inserts extra bits between the sampling points of a
CAN bus interface; however, in order to use this CAN+
protocol, CAN transceivers would have to have a higher bit
rate than they currently do, meaning that all ECUs would
have to be replaced. And, both Groza et al. [20] and Lin
et al. [27] used methods that send additional messages for
message authentication, which leads to a rapid increase in the
bus load (to more than 50%). In general, the bus load has
to remain under 50% of the maximum in order to preserve
a stable communication environment [39]. In other words,
this method would also require replacing existing devices
with new ones with higher performance capabilities in order
to maintain stable communication. Prior proposals therefore
require complete overhauls of the current and ubiquitous CAN
system and for that reason do not offer practical solutions.
In this paper, we propose a novel identification method
for the in-vehicle CAN network that can be directly applied
into the current system. Our method utilizes an add-on to the
current in-vehicle CAN network, without requiring replace-
ment of current ECUs, and complies with the standard CAN
in use today. We build on the idea of source identification
using signal characteristics in CAN ECUs, as first suggested
by Murvay et al. [32]. However, this work reflected two
weaknesses. First, Murvay et al. did not evaluate their method
on ECUs that manage critical functions using the high-speed
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2CAN network, but only used bit rates used in ECUs that
manage simpler functions on the low-speed CAN network.
Since it is much easier to achieve device identification using
the lower bit rate [18], they did not appropriately simulate
the CAN environment. Our method overcomes this weakness
by using the same bit rate that is used on the high-speed
CAN when ECUs perform critical functions (i.e, 500K b/s).
This is a significantly higher bit rate than Murvay et al.
applied [32]. Second, Murvay et al. failed to consider how
situations involving collisions would impact signal identifica-
tion using, as he did, the identifier field. A collision occurs
when more than two ECUs send data at the same time.
In a collision situation, signals are generated from multiple
ECUs, an arbitration system assigns priorities to the signals,
and lower priority signals are cut off. The identifier field,
which Murvay et al. relied upon, is unable to differentiate
signals under these collision circumstances, and therefore is
insufficient to accurately identify signal characteristics. By
contrast, our method measures signals using the extended
identifier field in the extended frame format of CAN, which
is able to accurately identify signals from all ECUs free of
any collision confusion that may be present in the identifier
field. In addition to accurately measuring all signals by using
the extended identifier field instead of the identifier field and
simulating the bit rate of the high-speed CAN, our method is
more than twice as accurate as previous research in identifying
which ECU sent a given message, in terms of false positive
rate.
A. Our Contributions
We propose our method for ECU identification based on
the inimitable characteristics of signals in the physical layer.
Our method is simpler and more transparent than ones using
message authentication, which in any case are not feasible in
existing in-vehicle CAN networks. Even if a message authen-
tication method could be developed compatible with existing
CANs, it would require the additional cost of a key exchange
or other key management system. Our method is able to
identify whether ECUs are valid or malicious without relying
on such method authentication systems. Our identification
method is also superior to the previous approach of Murvay
et al. [32] in terms of accuracy. Our main contributions are as
follows:
• Our method is able to identify ECUs only by installing
an additional device, meaning that our method can be
directly applied into current vehicles.
• Our method complies with current CAN standards and so
does not require replacement or alteration of ECUs that
have been installed in in-vehicle networks.
• Our method improves upon the work of Murvay et al.
[32] in that it analyzes more features of in-vehicle CANs,
including those that control critical functions; identifying
ECUs accurately even under collision conditions when
more than two ECUs transmit data simultaneously; and
testing our method at the same bit rate (500K b/s) as the
bit rate of the in-vehicle CAN network..
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
describes our motivation for this work to address limitations
of the in-vehicle CAN network. In Section III, we describe
background needed to understand our method. In Sections
4 and 5, we propose our system model and method for
ECU identification, respectively. In Section 6, we present our
experimental design and results, showing the accuracy of our
method. Section 7 describes related work revealing research
trends. Finally, we describe future work and our conclusion in
Sections 8 and 9, respectively.
II. MOTIVATIONS
Most security features are not compatible with the CAN,
so that it has been especially challenging to provide message
authentication to effectively protect the CAN from malicious
attackers. Without effective message authentication, every
ECU in the in-vehicle CAN network is able to freely commu-
nicate with every other ECU, opening the system up to replay
attacks. Since CAN packets contain no authenticator field, any
ECU can impersonate any other ECU in the in-vehicle CAN
network.
The lack of authentication makes the CAN vulnerable to a
variety of potential attacks, compromising reliable functioning
of vehicles. Koscher et al. were the first to demonstrate
several examples of attacks on modern vehicles [25]. It is
possible for an adversary to have the ability to systematically
control a wide array of components including the engine,
instrument panel, radio, heating and cooling, lights, brakes,
and locks. If an adversary attacks a vehicle during operation
of the vehicle, the lives of the driver and passengers can
be in danger. For example, Koscher et al. explained that an
adversary could forcibly and completely disengage the brakes.
Koscher et al. were only able to test potential threats using
direct physical access with a laptop connected to internal
vehicle networks. Next, Checkoway et al. demonstrated long-
range or indirect physical access attacks [10]. Applying their
adversary model, they found that it would be difficult for
vehicle owners to notice attacks. They connected in-vehicle
networks to external networks such as Bluetooth and audio
CD devices. For example, they suggested that an adversary
might deliver malicious input by encoding it as a song file.
When the modified media file is played on car audio system,
malicious CAN packets causing intentional malfunctions are
transmitted into in-vehicle CAN networks. They mentioned it
is possible for audio files to be spread though peer-to-peer
networks.
Against those demonstrations, we propose a novel method
that solves the fundamental security problems associated with
the in-vehicle CAN network. Our method works in the CAN
physical layer and extracts characteristics of each ECU from
measured analog signals. Even if security measures suggested
by previous researchers could be adapted to some new ECU
design, the effectiveness of which is uncertain, our method has
the distinct advantage of being compatible with the existing
CAN system. In particular, we do not require existing ECUs
to be replaced with new ones, and our method comports
with the existing state of CANs. Our work can be used
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Fig. 1: An example of variations in signaling
for such security purposes as intrusion detection (discovering
ECU impersonation and network tampering), authentication
(preventing unauthorized access to the physical network),
forensic data collection (tying a physical device to a specific
network incident), and quality assurance monitoring (deter-
mining whether a device will or is in the process of failing).
III. BACKGROUNDS
In this section, we describe device inconsistencies inherent
in ECUs and how Controller Area Networks (CANs) function,
in order to provide background necessary to understand our
method.
A. Inconsistency of Device Signals
We have already mentioned that message authentication is
actually impossible in the in-vehicle CAN network. Hence,
we do not seek to use message authentication, but rather
the goal of our work is to identify ECUs by examining the
distinctive analog and digital characteristics of these devices.
By differentiating ECUs based on the inimitable characteristics
of signals emitted by individual ECUs, we can identify which
ECUs are the original ones associated with the vehicle. Signals
with other characteristics would therefore be considered to
be attacks from a malicious adversary emanating from other
ECUs in the vehicle that have become hostage to an adversary
or from alien ECUs planted by the adversary in the vehicle.
This method makes use of ECU hardware and manufacturing
inconsistencies. Figure 1 shows an example of inherent vari-
ations in signaling behavior of CAN transceivers. Although
two transceivers might appear to be identical products from
the same vendor and sending the exact same message, they
generate different signals. Those inconsistencies cause minute
and unique variations in the signaling behavior of every
digital device [18]. There are even minute variations in signals
sent from the very same ECU in a particular vehicle. In
general, the variations are within a defined range and the
unique characteristics of signals from individual ECUs remain
constant over time; therefore, ECUs can be identified by their
unique signals.
B. CANs (Controller Area Networks)
CAN is a communication protocol which was developed in
the mid-1980s by Bosch GmbH [19]. CAN was first designed
to provide a cost-effective communication bus for automotive
applications, but is today widely used in various industries
such as aerospace and railways, elevators, and medical devices
[13]. It is necessary to understand the physical layer of CAN,
because our method deals with characteristics in the physical
layer. Since today’s in-vehicle communications are designed
based on the CAN 2.0 standard, we explain the CAN standards
in terms of i) encoding / data transmission, ii) data frame
formats, and iii) arbitration. In general, the in-vehicle CAN
network topology is divided into two groups: the high-speed
CAN and low-speed CAN (fault-tolerant CAN). The low-
speed CAN consists of ECUs for easy functions such as the
door open / lock function. Other more critical functions, such
as engine or brake functions, are connected to the high-speed
CAN. In this paper, we only consider the high-speed CAN,
because this presents the most challenging environment for
identifying signal characteristics [18]. Accordingly, once we
show that our method is able to identify characteristics at a
higher bit rate, it will follow that it will also be able to do so
at a lower bit rate.
0 1bit 1bit
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Fig. 2: CAN data frame format (Extended frame)
1) Encoding / Data Transmission: The CAN signal is
encoded using the Non Return to Zero (NRZ) bit encoding
method, in which 1 is represented by one particular voltage
and 0 is represented by some other significant voltage. A
twisted pair of two wires in a shielded cable is used for
Can communication. Both lines, CAN-H (High) and CAN-L
(Low) are biased at 2.5 volts in the case of the recessive state
(1). For the dominant state (0), CAN-H goes to around 3.5
volts and CAN-L to 1.5 volts, respectively. In terms of device
inconsistencies, those degrees of voltage are all different for
different devices. From those differences, we determine the
signal characteristics that correspond to particular ECUs.
2) Data Frame Format: The CAN defines four types of
frames: i) data frame, ii) remote frame, iii) error frame, and
iv) overload frame. Of these four types, we only describe the
4TABLE I: Fields of extended frame format
Field Length Description
(bits)
Start-of-frame 1 Means the start of frame transmis-
sion
Identifier 11 An identifier of transmitter, which
also represents the message priority
Substitute
remote request
(SRR)
1 Must be recessive state (1)
Identifier exten-
sion bit (IDE)
1 Indicating whether 11 bit identifier
or 29 bit extended identifier is used.
Dominant state (0) indicate 11 bit
identifier while Recessive state (1)
indicate 29 bit extended
Extended iden-
tifier (EXID)
18 If IDE is Recessive state (1), EXID
field is available
Reserved bits 2 -
Data length
code (DLC)
4 Number of bytes of data (0-8 bytes)
Data field 0-64 Data to be transmitted
CRC 15 Cyclic redundancy check
CRC delimiter 1 Must be recessive state (1)
ACK slot 1 Transmitter sends recessive state
(1) and any receiver can assert a
dominant sate (0)
ACK delimiter 1 Must be recessive state (1)
End-of-frame 7 Must be recessive sate (1)
data frame, because the purpose of our method is to identify
which ECU is transmitting the data frame. As an interesting
features of the CAN, the identifier field of the data frame
refers to the identifier of the transmitter ECU not that of the
receiver. Accordingly, it is possible to determine which ECU
is transmitting the data frame by checking the identifier. Our
goal is to detect an impersonator and identify the ECU from
which that impersonator is transmitting, using its unique signal
characteristics. There are two types of data frames: one is the
base frame format whose identifier length is 11 bits, and the
other is the extended frame format, which has 29 identifier
bits made up of the 11-bit identifier and an 18-bit identifier
extension. We refer to the extended identifier as EXID. To use
the extended frame format, the identifier extension bit (IDE)
is transmitted in the recessive (1) state. Figure 2, shows an
overview of the CAN data frame and we describe each field
in the data frame in Table I. Our method measures signals
corresponding to the bit string of the extended identifier field.
The reason why we do not use the signals corresponding to
the identifier field is because of arbitration. We will describe
arbitration below.
3) Arbitration / Extended Identifier: There are times when
more than two ECUs each transmit data at the same time. To
prioritize such collision signals, CAN supports a lossless bit-
wise arbitration method. If one ECU transmits a dominant bit
(0) and another ECU transmits a recessive bit (1), then there
is a collision and the dominant bit gets higher priority. During
transmission, an ECU continuously checks on the bus and
compares the signal states, recessive or dominant. Since the
identifier field is the first field in the data frame, the identifier
field is important in terms of the arbitration decision. The
priority of ECU signals depends on their identifiers. Figure 3
Start 
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SRR IDE
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nded 
Ident
ifier
(18
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Rest 
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Fig. 3: An example of arbitration between two nodes
shows an example of how one of two ECU signals gets higher
priority through arbitration. The two ECUs have different
identifiers for the first time in the 6th bit of the identifier,
where ECU A is dominant (0) and B is recessive (1). ECU A
gets higher priority, and ECU B’s signal is cut off and can try
again later. Before an arbitration decision, multiple signals in
the identifier field are generated from multiple ECUs. In our
example in Figure 3, the first five parts of the signals being
sent from the two ECUs are the signal generated by both
ECUs. Accordingly, it is impossible to identify the unique
characteristics of each single ECU from the signals in the
identifier field. The extended identifier field was originally
created in the CAN to accommodate situations requiring
identification of more connection devices than the identifier
field could accommodate. The identifier field in the CAN is
able to assign identifiers to many more connection devices than
the 50-70 ECUs found in vehicles, since the identifier field is
capable of identifying thousands of connection devices at a
time. The increased capacity of the extended identifier field
was needed for other industry applications. However, in the
case of in-vehicle ECUs, the deficiency of the identifier field
is not in the number of connection devices it can potentially
identify, but rather is in its incapacity to differentiate the
accurate ECU origin of signals under collision conditions.
Hence, our activation and use of the extended identifier field
is not to increase the number of potential identifiers, as it was
originally created to do, but rather to overcome the problem of
signal identification created by signal collisions. Since there
are only 50-70 ECUs in a vehicle and the identifier field
will have been sufficient to handle all arbitration decisions,
we therefore programmed the extended identifier field to be
included into the data frame along with the content of the
message.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present a system model for our method.
Figure 4 shows how our method works in order to identify
ECUs in the in-vehicle CAN network. As shown in Figure 4,
our system model adds a monitoring unit to the CAN. The
monitoring unit is programmed to analyze sent messages in
several ways. First, it extracts the known ECU identifier from
the identifier field and determines whether the identifier is a
known identifier or not. Second, the monitoring unit analyzes
the features of the signals in a sent message with the enabled
extended identifier field. Basically, the monitoring system
utilizes a classification algorithm to which the same message
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Fig. 4: System Model
is sent multiple times so that the algorithm can learn them
to create a fingerprint template of the unique characteristic
from each ECU. Hence, the unique signal characteristics of
each ECU are contained in fingerprints as determined by our
fingerprinting method. For example, the monitoring unit will
know that signals to turn on and off the engine are sent by
ECU 1, while signals to control the brakes are sent by ECU 2.
The monitoring unit is programmed to know which identifiers
should match which fingerprints: it has both ECU identifiers
and signal fingerprints in correct pairings.
The monitoring unit receives signals sent by all ECUs, and
since it knows which signals should be coming from which
ECU, it will know when signals are sent by the wrong ECU.
In the case of an adversary attack, the adversary can use the
identifier of the ECU that the adversary knows should be
sending the signal (telling the engine to shut off, for example).
When that happens, the monitoring unit will know that the
signal did not originate from the ECU that it is paired with,
the one that is supposed to be generating that signal. This
will identify the presence of an adversary and the mismatched
fingerprint will identify the ECU that was actually used by the
adversary to send the signal, if it is an existing ECU that has
been taken hostage by the adversary, or it will indicate that the
signal originated from some other completely unknown device.
In other words, when a particular signal is not being generated
from the properly assigned ECU identifier, the monitoring
system knows it and it then sends an alarm to the vehicle
owner.
Because CAN bus ECUs are all connected to the same
shared bus line, we can apply our method to current vehicle
systems by adding the monitoring unit to the in-vehicle CAN
network and adjusting ECU programming to include the
extended identifier field in ECU signals. To clarify our method,
we will describe some possible adversary models and our
underlying assumptions about the CAN.
A. Adversary Models
The goal of adversaries is to transmit malicious commands
to the in-vehicle CAN network so that the adversary can take
control of the vehicle. Because the CAN does not support
message authentication, an adversary could simply attack by
connecting with the in-vehicle CAN network and launching a
replay attack. We consider two types of adversary threats based
on how the adversary would be able to access the in-vehicle
CAN network.
Adversary Model Type I. The first adversary method is
one where the adversary gains access through an additional
external device that is physically planted by the adversary.
The new device could be inserted into the On-Board Di-
agnostics (OBD)-II port, which is an interface between in-
vehicle networks, including the in-vehicle CAN network. OBD
systems give the vehicle owner or repair technician access
to the status of various vehicle subsystems. Various tools are
available that plug into the OBD connector to access in-vehicle
sub-networks, including in the CAN network. Since the OBD-
II port is located under the dashboard, an adversary could
gain access to the in-vehicle CAN network by attaching an
additional device to the OBD-II port. The adversary could
also gain access through an external device (e.g., laptop or
smartphone). A mobile device-based or PC-based scan tool is
one that an adversary can easily buy on the Internet [1], [3].
Using such additional devices, an adversary is able to transmit
malicious commands.
Adversary Model Type II. The second adversary model is
for the adversary to compromise an existing ECU in the in-
vehicle CAN network. In this attack, an adversary basically
takes an existing ECU hostage to imitate existing signal
features and send messages with the correct signal but from
a different ECU that they have been able to take hostage. To
root out attackers who are operating from a hostage ECU, we
needed to identify signal fingerprints that are not paired with
the correct ECU identifier. One example would be compromise
of a telematics ECU. Telematics ECUs are being installed
in more and more vehicles to enable additional functions
(e.g., remote engine start through a smartphone). Due to the
fact that telematics ECUs provide several access points of
access through external networks such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi,
and 3G communication, telematics ECUs are vulnerable to
attack by the adversary. In fact, Chekoway et al. performed
such an attack on a telematics ECU using these known
vulnerabilities [10]. After compromising a telematics ECU,
the adversary is then able to transmit messages to intentionally
cause malfunctions.
We separate adversary models according to the way an
adversary is able to connect to the in-vehicle CAN network.
We consider Adversary Model Type I to constitute a lesser
threat than Adversary Model Type II. For one thing, it is
difficult for a Type I adversary to succeed since it requires
additional devices to be plugged into the OBD-II port that can
easily be seen by the driver and removed. Since Type I is so
much more difficult to localize and eradicate, we designed our
method to be effective with a Type II adversary. Our method
can be used to address both types of adversaries
B. Our Assumptions
Our method uses the extended frame format instead of the
base frame format, since the base frame format with only its
identifier field does not properly identify signal characteristics
6in collision situations, described in Section 3. The extended
frame format contains both the 11-bit identifier field and also
an 18-bit extended identifier field. We assume that all arbi-
tration decisions are made within the identifier field since we
know that it has the capacity to accommodate all signals sent
by the 50-70 some vehicle ECUs. Based on the assumption
that all collision signals will have been subject to arbitration
decisions in the identifier field, we further assume that signals
in the extended identifier field are not affected by arbitration
decisions so that the unique characteristics of signals from
different ECUs will be distinguishable. In other words, we as-
sume that the extended identifier field will allow measurement
of physical signals of all sent messages without interference
from the effects of arbitration that render the identifier field
by itself to be unreliable in accurately distinguishing those
characteristics. The second assumption is that it is impossible
to imitate an ECU’s unique signal characteristics. Due to the
effects of hardware inconsistencies, there are subtle differences
between devices in terms of signal variation. Thus, we assume
that those variations are unique characteristics of devices and
inimitable. Although an adversary could learn ECU identifier,
the adversary could not hide the fact that a message is being
sent from an alien or from a hostage ECU. Finally, we assume
that a single malicious command will not be effective to cause
vehicle malfunction. For example, if an adversary wants to
incapacitate the brake system, he must transmit malicious
messages over and over until the intended malfunction occurs.
This means that a single malicious message is assumed to
be ineffective. We therefore assume that an adversary will
transmit malicious messages repeatedly in order to perpetrate
an attack on a vehicle.
V. OUR METHOD
We describe the method we developed to identify ECUs in
an in-vehicle CAN network. We utilized the characteristics of
CAN signals that are generated from the CAN transceiver from
each ECU. Our main idea was to extract suitable statistical
features of signals, which include unique characteristics, and
then classified these unique signals into Adversary Model Type
I or Adversary Model Type II. A detailed description of our
method follows.
A. Assigning Bit String / Data Collection
We measured the physical signal transmitted by an ECU
as identified in the extended identifier field in the CAN data
frame. First of all, we defined the extended identifier as an 18-
bit string, so that every signal in the CAN data frame would
have the same length bit string in the extended identifier field.
Moreover, the most significant bit (MSB) of the bit string was
0 to prevent bit stuffing at a different location. In the CAN
network, six consecutive bits of the same type are considered
to be an error, so that bit stuffing automatically occurs in the
CAN network when one bit of the opposite polarity is inserted
after five consecutive bits of the same polarity. The other 17
bits could be any value (i.e., 0 or 1) as follows:
EXID = b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9b10b11b12b13b14b15b16b17b18,
(1)
where b1 = 0 and bi ∈ {0, 1}, 2 ≤ i ≤ 18. We measured
a signal corresponding to the extended identifier field. The
sampled signal was denoted by S(k), a set of sample values.
B. Fingerprint Generation
We took the method proposed by S. Dey et al. [12] in
order to extract suitable statistical features from the sampled
signal S(k). For the sampled signal S(k), we extracted 40
scalar features in both time and frequency domains using
LibXtract, a popular feature extraction library [2]. Among the
40 possible features, we selected the only relevant features
by ranking the features using the FEAST toolbox and utilize
the joint mutual information criterion for ranking [9]. From
the results, we selected the top 8 time domain features and
9 frequency domain features. Table II and Table III show the
selected 17 features. As a result, our method extracted those
17 features from a sampled signal, then the following steps
were performed to identify individual ECUs, each with its
own unique identifying characteristics.
TABLE II: A list of time domain features. Vector x is
the time domain representation of the data. N is the
number elements in x
Feature Name Description
Mean xˆ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x(i)
Std-Dev σ =
√
1
N−1
∑N
i−1(x(i)− x)
Average Deviation Dx= 1
N
∑N
i=1 |x(i)−x|
Skewness γ = 1
N
∑N
i−1(
x(i)−x
σ
)3
Kurtosis β = 1
N
∑N
i=1(
x(i)−x
σ
)4 − 3
RMS Amplitude A =
√
1
N
∑N
i=1(x(i))
2
Lowest Value L = (Min(x(i))|i=1..N )
Highest Value H = (Max(x(i))|i=1..N )
TABLE III: A list of frequency domain features.
Vector y is the frequency domain representation of
the data. Vectors ym and yf hold the magnitude
coefficients and bin frequencies respectively. N is the
number of elements in ym and yf .
Feature Name Description
Spec. Std-Dev σs =√
(
∑N
i=1(yf (i))
2 ∗ ym(i)))/(
∑N
i=1 ym(i))
Spec. Skewness γs = (
∑N
i=1 yf (i)ym(i))/σ
3
s
Spec. Kurtosis βs = (
∑N
i=1(ym(i)− Cs)4 ∗ ym(i))/σ4s − 3
Spec. Centroid Cs = (
∑N
i=1 yf (i)ym(i))/(
∑N
i=1 ym(i))
Irregularity-K IKs =∑N−1
i=2 |ym(i)− ym(i−1)+ym(i)+ym(i+1)3 |
Irregularity-J IJs =
∑N−1
i=1 (ym(i)−ym(i+1))2∑N−1
i=1 (ym(i))
2
Roll off Rs = SampleRateN ∗ n|∑ni=1 ym<Threshold
Flatness Fs = (
∏N
i=1 ym(i))
1
N /((
∑N
i=1 ym(i))/N)
Smoothness Ss =
∑N−1
i=2 |20.log(ym(i))−
(20.log(ym(i−1))+20.log(ym(i))+20.log(ym(i+1)))
3
|
A set of selected features of S(k) is denoted as F (S). As a
result, we extracted each set of features F (S) corresponding
7to a measured signal S(k). Accordingly, F (S) represents the
fingerprint of an ECU.
C. Fingerprint template generation
ECU signals are as distinctive as fingerprints. We needed
some way to leverage the set of distinctive signal features
to permit identification of the ECU generating that particular
set of features. To achieve this goal, we used a classification
algorithm which is designed for the problem of identifying to
which of a set of categories a new observation belongs, on the
basis of a training set of data containing observations whose
category membership is known. In this paper, the concept of
using a classification algorithm is to train a classifier with a
lot of CAN signals that valid ECUs sends and then, the signal
that a malicious ECU sends can be identified by the trained
classifier. We note that classification algorithms are already
broadly utilized as a useful tool for security methods. For
example, IDSs (Intrusion Detection Systems) can be designed
with a classification algorithm to detect an anomaly behavior
in a network [17]. Accordingly, we can say that our method
with a classification algorithm is also acceptable. To generate
ECU fingerprint templates, the first step was to create a
classifier by using observations from ECUs as inputs. The
observations were the sets of 17 features for each ECU, that
is, the F (S) of each ECU. The classifier was then trained in
a supervised machine learning environment so that it could
later be used to compare new observations to the previously-
observed sets. Our goal was to train the classifier to recognize
each signal’s features, its fingerprint, to use as a reference
to later match with the identifier for the ECU that should
be generating that fingerprint. Later, if the signal fingerprint
does not match that ECU identifier, we can conclude that the
fingerprint is from an alien source and can send an alarm to the
vehicle owner (Type I adversary model). Even if a fingerprint
matches a valid ECU identifier, it should be checked if the
identified ECU is allowed to send a command which is one of
the CAN messages. When it is detected for a ECU to send a
command that the ECU is not allowed to send, this means that
the ECU is compromised by an adversary (Type II adversary
model).
The classifier is trained with n sets of features for each ECU.
In our case, we designed twelve CAN development boards
to simulate standard ECUs. In order to train the classifier to
recognize all twelve ECUs, we first created fingerprints by
inputting 900 observations in the form of 900 signals sent
from each ECU. Although the same message was being sent
from the same ECU, each signal observation would have slight
variations of the 17 features of that ECU’s signals. Through
this supervised learning, we trained the classifier to average the
slight variations in each ECU’s signals into twelve fingerprint
templates. This procedure would typically be performed to
produce fingerprint templates at the time of manufacture of a
vehicle. And, it would need to be performed again whenever
a new ECU is added to or an ECU is removed from the in-
vehicle network; however, we note that adding, removing, or
replacing an ECU after initial manufacture is an infrequent
occurrence in an in-vehicle network, so that this learning phase
is not frequently performed after leaving the factory.
D. Fingerprint Matching
After completing the above learning phase, Fingerprint
template generation, which produced fingerprint templates
for existing ECUs in the vehicle, we then proceeded to the
testing phase and matched new signals with the previously
learned fingerprints. Two types of fingerprint matching were
performed. First, we tested for signs of Type I adversaries.
Since Type I adversaries utilize additional devices that are
not identified in the known database of ECU identifiers and
therefore send signals that are not in the monitor’s database
of known signal fingerprints, the monitoring unit needs to
determine whether there is a sufficient match with any of the
known fingerprints or not. If the monitoring unit can not match
new signals with any known signals fingerprint templates,
the inquiry is over. It means there is an adversary with a
completely alien signal from a completely alien device. The
alien signal identification belongs to novelty detection which
is the identification of new or unknown data that a machine
learning system has not been trained with [31]. We presented a
simple threshold-based approach for alien detection problem,
which is a convenient extension of our classification-based
basic model.
Comparing a new signal with a given feature set F(S) to
all known fingerprint templates in the classifier yields scores
showing the new feature set F(s) belongs to the known one of
the fingerprint templates. Thus, if all scores are below the
threshold, we classify the feature set F(S) to the class of
unknown sets (i.e., an invalid ECU or device is the source
of the signal). In short, we set a threshold, explained in
Subsection VI-D, below which the monitoring unit determines
that a newly identified fingerprint is an unknown adversary. An
alarm will be sent.
By contrast, for Type II attacks we can directly apply
a probabilistic model to determine which fingerprint in the
known database a new signal most closely matches. Once we
have determined that there are no alien ECUs, we can then
determine if signals are being sent by an ECU other than the
one properly paired with its signal fingerprint. To accomplish
this, we produced fingerprints of new signals and matched
them against known identifiers in Adversary Model Type II to
ensure that they were consistent with known fingerprints. In
this testing phase, the monitoring system searched the database
of known fingerprints and matched the new fingerprint based
on the probabilistic model; that is, it determined the known
fingerprint with the highest probability of being the same as
the new fingerprint above all others in the known database. It
then determined whether that fingerprint originated from the
correct ECU identifier programmed into the monitoring unit
for that fingerprint. A mismatch resulted in an alarm to the
owner.
We note that the essential difference between the two
types of classifications is whether a threshold is used to
determine that a new fingerprint is not in the known database
of fingerprints at all, leading to the conclusion that there is an
external malicious device (Type I), or whether a probabilistic
model is used to determine whether a known signal fingerprint
has been sent from an alien ECU within the CAN, leading to
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the conclusion that an existing ECU has been taken hostage
to send malicious messages from another ECU in the CAN
(Type II).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluated our method by performing a series of ex-
periments. We assessed both our success rate in detecting
alien signals (Adversary Type I) and in identifying correctly
or incorrectly matched pairs of signal features and ECUs
(Adversary Type II). Our experiments yielded success rates
in both of over 90%. This success rate should be trustworthy
to identify adversaries since, as we mentioned in section 4.2
above, successful adversary attacks are expected to occur in
the in-vehicle CAN network only after transmitting multiple
malicious signals. Accordingly, the probability that an adver-
sary will succeed in an attack gets much lower because the
adversary must be classified as within the class of known
ECUs many times in order for the system to be duped into
accepting an adversary message or source as a legitimate one.
We use typical metrics common to machine learning and data
mining are used to evaluate our method [4].
A. Experimental Setup
We tested our method with more than 900 input observa-
tions, which were signals with the same message, sent from
each of 12 CAN development boards (shown as CAN Board
A and B in Table IV). The sample signals were at the 500K bit
rate typically used in the in-vehicle high-speed CAN. In fact,
there is another in-vehicle CAN network topology, a low-speed
(fault tolerant) CAN whose bit rate is only 100K or 125K bits
per second. In this paper, we used only the high-speed CAN
and its bit rate. It is more difficult to identify devices using
signal characteristics sampled at a high bit rate than at a low
bit rate, so we assumed that if our method worked successfully
at a high-speed CAN bit rate, then it would also function
well at the low-speed CAN (fault tolerant) bit rate [18]. In
addition, we used the default applications for classification
provided by MatLab R2016a in order to use its classification
algorithms [29]. The classification algorithms we used were
Support Vector Machine (SVM), Neural Network (NN), and
Bagged Decision Tree (BDT) with default options MatLab
provides. We performed the 10-fold cross validation test as
a model validation technique for assessing how the results
of a statistical analysis will generalize to an independent
data set. In 10-fold cross validation, a given data set was
partitioned into ten folds. A classifier was trained with nine
folds (training data) and the classification model was tested
with the remaining one fold (testing data). This process was
repeated ten times so that each fold could be used exactly
once as the validation data. We used the averaged classification
accuracy as 10-fold cross validation accuracy (i.e., every result
which we show in this section is the result of 10-fold cross
validation test). In Subsection IV-A above, we mentioned two
adversary models and we proceeded to evaluate our method
on Adversary Model Type I and the other in a Type II
framework. Fig. 5 and Table IV shows the purpose of using
each component and its specification. We note that even though
the total number of ECUs is about 70 in case of a luxury
sedan, in-vehicle networks are physically divided into several
sub-networks. Volvo XC90, for example, has 7-12 ECUs for
an in-vehicle subnetwork [33].
TABLE IV: Components of experimental setup
Components Specification Explanation
HDO6104 (Lecroy) For CAN
Bandwidth: 1GHz data frame, it
Oscilloscope Sampling rate: 2.5GS/s measures
Vertical resolution: 12-bit voltage signal
CAN bus net-
work
CAN breakout box (National
Instrument)
It provides
CAN bus
network
Monitoring
tool for CAN
Communica-
tion
Off-the-shelf laptop
CAN Communication moni-
toring tool: PCAN-Explorer
It monitors
CAN packets
on the CAN
bus network
Order-made board
CAN
development
board
Microcontroller:
TMS320F28335 (TEXAS
INSTRUMENTS)
It transmits
CAN data
frame
(Type A) Transceiver: MCP2551 (MI-
CROCHIP)
TR28335 Training Kit (Sync-
Works)
CAN
development
board
Microcontroller:
TMS320F28335 (TEXAS
INSTRUMENTS)
It transmits
CAN data
frame
(Type B) Transceiver: SN65HVD235
(TEXAS INSTRUMENTS)
B. Basic Identification
Our method uses voltage signals corresponding to extended
identifier field of the CAN data frame, which are gener-
ated by CAN transceivers of ECUs. As a simple evaluation
of our method, we define the 18-bit extended identifier as
010101010101010101(2). For the total 29-bit identifier, the
most significant 11-bit identifier is used for standard identifiers
and the least significant 18-bit identifier is used for extended
identifiers of ECUs. As we mentioned in Subsection III-B, the
identifier extension bit (IDE) is what triggers the inclusion of
the extended identifier field in the signal. When we define
9TABLE V: Confusion matrix for identifying ECUs when SVM, NN, and BDT are used, respectively
ECU1 ECU2 ECU3 ECU4 ECU5 ECU6 ECU7 ECU8 ECU9 ECU10 ECU11 ECU12
ECU1 98.22/
98.33/
97.78
0/ 0/ 0.11 0/ 0/ 0 0.67/
0.33/
0.22
1.11/
1.22/
1.89
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0.11/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0
ECU2 0/ 0/ 0 95.89/
95.11/
95.89
0/ 0/ 0 4.11/
4.89/
4.11
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0
ECU3 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 99.33/
98.78/
98.67
0.67/
1.00/
1.33
0/ 0.22/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0
ECU4 0.78/
0.44/
0.44
6.78/
4.78/
6.33
0.56/
1.00/
0.89
91.67/
93.78/
91.67
0.22/ 0/
0.67
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0
ECU5 1.44/
1.33/
2.11
0/ 0/ 0 0.11/
0.11/
0.11
0/ 0/ 0.78 98.33/
98.44/
97.00
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0.11/ 0 0.11/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0
ECU6 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ ‘0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 86.33/
85.00/
86.33
0/ 0/ 0 0.44/
0.56/
0.44
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 13.22/
14.44/
13.22
0/ 0/ 0
ECU7 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 99.78/
99.78/
99.56
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0.22/
0.22/
0.44
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0
ECU8 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 1.89/
1.22/
1.56
0/ 0/ 0 97.00/
97.56/
95.22
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 1.11/
1.22/
3.22
0/ 0/ 0
ECU9 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 100/
99.89/
99.44
0/ 0.11/
0.56
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0
ECU10 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0.22 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0.11 100/ 100/
99.00
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0.67
ECU11 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0.11/ 0 13.22/
12.44/
14.22
0/ 0/ 0 1.89/
1.67/
2.78
0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 84.89/
85.78/
83.00
0/ 0/ 0
ECU12 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0 0/ 0/ 0.22 0/ 0/ 0 100/ 100/
99.78
TABLE VI: Overall success rate corresponding to different bit string of extended identifer using three different
classification algorithms: SVM, NN, and BDT
EXID
SVM NN BDT
Kernel function # Hidden nodes # Classifiers
Linear RBF 10 50 100 10 50 100
0000...0000(2) 94.94 91.75 95.78 96.41 96.48 95.40 95.79 95.92
0101...1010(2) 95.24 88.26 95.32 95.44 95.28 94.07 94.69 94.83
1111...1111(2) 76.50 76.59 79.51 82.71 82.13 82.25 84.20 84.71
the IDE as 1, the extended frame format is enabled. Since
ambiguous collision signals are assumed to occur only in the
standard identifier field with arbitration decisions that then
result in one signal never being sent, and since our monitoring
unit only analyzes sent messages, the signal corresponding to
the extended identifier is an unambiguous signal generated by
a single ECU. The extended identifier field, unlike the standard
identifier field, does not involve multiple signals that collide
and are the subject of arbitration and any confusion about
proper identification of the bits in the signal are simply no
longer a problem.
Using signals identified with the extended identifier field,
we extract statistical features corresponding to each signal and
then performed classification methods on the features. Table
V is the confusion matrix which shows the success and mis-
classification rates using three typical classification methods.
Each diagonal cell indicates the success rate for that signal
or observation to be classified in the valid ECU, with three
values representing the rates obtained from three different
classification algorithms: SVM with linear kernel, NN with
100 hidden nodes, and BDT with 100 classifiers, in that order.
It notes that we will show that theses parameters outperform
the others in next subsection. The confusion matrix is a specific
table layout that allow visualization of the performance of an
algorithm, typically a supervised learning one. Each column
of the matrix represents the instances in a predicted class,
while each row represents the instances that the class was
actually identified. The results show that our method has a
higher success rate than that of Mervay et al. [32]. We note that
Mervay et al. obtained a misclassification rate of up to 99.9%
but our misclassification rate was up to 15% and mostly lower
than 5%. This result is only available for Type II adversary
model. The result considering Type I adversary model will be
mentioned in Subsection VI-D, Identifying unknown ECUs.
We conclude our method can accurately identify ECUs.
C. Identifying known ECUs
In the above subsection, we evaluated the success rates for
classification when the 18-bit extended identifier is defined as
000000000000000000(2). In this subsection, we calculate the
overall success rates while changing the extended identifier to
other bit strings. We want to know whether bit strings affect
our success rate or not. Thus, we additionally selected typical
two bit strings because the number of times the state switches
from a recessive state to a dominant state, or the other way
around, may have a significant effect on the success rate. The
reason why the most significant bit we selected is 0 because of
bit stuffing. Due to the fact that the IDE is 1 bit, we can avoid
the case that bit stuffing occurs at different bit locations when
we define the most significant bit of the extended identifier as
0 bit. Table VI shows the overall identification rates when the
extended identifier is defined with a different bit string. We
used typical parameters which are used in three classification
algorithm. We can see that linear kernel function, 100 hidden
nodes, and 100 classifiers achieve the best performance of
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Fig. 6: Both FN and FP rate with varying threshold
SVM, NN, BDT, respectively. In next subsection, we evaluate
our method with only these parameters.
In addition, this shows that the success rate varies according
to the bit string given to the extended identifier field. Our
method reaches the highest rate when the extended identifier
was 000000000000000000(2) and NN with 100 hidden layers
was performed. Even though we did not evaluate more bit
string identifiers for the field, the success rates for both
000000000000000000(2) and 010101010101010101(2) are ac-
ceptable. From these results, we conclude that we get better
result when there are enough dominant states (i.e., 0 bit).
D. Identifying unknown ECUs
In the above subsection, we evaluated our method only
considering Type II adversary model. To address a Type I
adversary where an attacker attaches a new device to OBD-II
port to connect to the in-vehicle CAN network, our method
must classify the new device as belonging to the unknown
class. As we mentioned in Section V, identifying unknown
ECUs is related to novelty detection which is the identification
of new or unknown data that a machine learning system has
not been trained with [31]. We utilized a threshold-based
approach which is a convenient and effective extension of
our classification-based basic model. By using this approach,
we can identify unknown ECUs while preserving our basic
classification model. Accordingly, we define a threshold and
perform the same classification methods as in the above basic
experiment. In the threshold model, we consider that signals
whose scores corresponding to known classes are all below
the threshold are from the unknown class. The overall success
rates of the threshold-based identification are less or equal to
ones of the basic identification without a threshold, because
the case that classification scores is less than a threshold is
classified as an unknown class, even if the result is correct.
FN (False Negative) case refers to the case that an valid
ECU is classified as an alien (i.e., an unknown ECU) and
FP (False Positive) case refers to the case that an unknown
ECU is classified as one of the valid ECUs. Fig. 6 shows both
FN and FP rates corresponding to varying threshold. When
we defined a higher threshold, FN rates went up, while FP
rates went down. Even though SVM did not output the best
performance among three different classification algorithms
in Subsection VI-B, SVM can perfectly distinguish between
known ECUs and unknown ECUs by utilizing a threshold of
between −2.6 × 1015 and −2.4 × 109 at which EER (Equal
Error Rate) is 0. For NN, EER is 0.38 at a threshold of 0.9999,
meaning that it is not available to identify an alien. As a result,
we conclude our method outputs the most acceptable result
when either SVM with linear kernel function or BDT with
100 classifiers is used.
Both CAN2USB-interface and ELM327 are typical devices
that can be connected to the OBD II port and adversaries can
purchase those devices quite inexpensively [1], [3]. Accord-
ingly, we assume that those devices are likely candidates for
launching attacks. Using those devices, we sampled more than
1,000 observations or signals per device.
VII. RELATED WORKS
Fingerprinting is a well-established biometrics techniques
for identifying human beings [35], [36]. Beginning in the
20th century, the concept of fingerprinting has been used to
identify devices as well. In particular, World War II made it
both important and popular to try to identify radar, radios, and
other wireless communications [22]. Many researchers have
continued to study identification of wireless signals right up to
the present [14], [37], [6], [21], [15], [30], [16]. These methods
are usually based upon minor variations in analog hardware
in transmitters, utilizing the individual characteristics of the
transmitters [8]. Fundamentally, the approach to identifying
devices according to their unique characteristic recognizes that
physical device are all different in the way they produce sig-
nals, even when they are produced by the same manufacture.
Some previous works has identified network devices by
using the clock skew of the devices. On a network such as the
Internet closck skew describes the difference in time shown by
the clocks at different nodes on the network. Accordingly, it is
possible to distinguish devices through TCP and ICMP times-
tamps [24]. Previous research has studied not only hardware-
based fingerprinting, but also software-based fingerprinting.
Software-based fingerprinting uses patterns traceable to a user.
For example, by analyzing month-logs, users can be tracked or
identified [40]. Browser history can also be used for tracking
or identifying users [34]. Software-based fingerprinting uses a
uniqueness of users’ patterns such as current configuration of
the system (e.g., screen resolution, or list of fonts installed in
a system) [5].
Recently, since various smart devices including smartphones
are being developed, there has been a substantial amount
of work done on smart device fingerprinting. In order to
identify smart devices, researchers use smart device sensor.
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Camera sensor identification is one of the main methods for
identifying smart devices [28], [26]. Based on the sensor’s
pattern noise, it is possible to distinguish images for the same
scene. The images include unique differences because camera
sensors are all different from one another. The embedded
acoustic components of smartphones have also been used
to identify smartphones [11], [7]. Moreover, different micro-
phones convert the same sound source into different electronic
signals, or conversely loudspearkers convert the same audio
signals into different sounds in the air. By using the unique
characteristics of each device, it is possible to identify micro-
phones and loudspeakers when analyzed separately or together.
Another approach to identifying sensors in smartphones is to
use accelerometer [12], [7]. Accelerometers measure 3-axis
acceleration and regulate, for example, smart phone screen
rotation. The measured values are a little bit different in
each accelerometer. Compared to other methods mentioned,
which compare devices emitting the same sound or image,
accelerometers use gravitational acceleration (i.e., 9.8m/s2)
that is always detectable. Accelerometers show that we do not
have to be using the artificial same source to be identified by
sensor devices.
Similar to our work, there are several researchers who have
identified devices or transmitters in wired communication.
Gerdes et al. proposed a method for identification of wired
Ethernet devices [18]. They used the matched filter (known
as a North filter) to compute the correlation between a target
signal and a reference signal and thereby identify the devices.
Murvay et al. proposed a method for source identification us-
ing signal characteristics in CANs (Controller Area Networks)
[32]. Their work was the first approach to identifying ECUs
using inimitable characteristic of signals. However, the success
rate of their method is not sufficient to effectively identify at-
tackers in a real environment. Furthermore, their experimental
model did not sufficiently simulate critical functions of the
in-vehicle CAN network.
VIII. LIMITATION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this section, we discuss limitations of our method and
future work to improve the method. Our method uses the
extended frame format instead of base frame format. Even
though this frame format is part of the standard CAN envi-
ronment, current in-vehicle networks currently function solely
with the base frame format. Thus, our method can be used
without changing ECU hardware, but ECU firmware would
need to be updated in order to use the extended frame format.
This firmware update would involve new programming in new
vehicles or reprogramming in older cars, but again, replace-
ment of existing ECU hardware is not required. Because our
method considers that one ECU belongs to one class, we need
a fixed bit string for one ECU. However, if it is possible to
get enough long fixed bit string form base frame format not
extended frame format, we do not have to update existing
firmware. As a result, we plan to do future work to develop a
method without using the extended frame format.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have presented our new method to identify ECUs
using inimitable characteristics of signals emitted from dif-
ferent ECUs. Since our method only requires installation of
a monitoring unit to the in-vehicle CAN network, without
any change in ECU hardware, our method can be directly
and transparently applied into the current system. In addition,
our method adequately simulates the CAN standard and is
compatible with it. Thus, we have minimized the required
cost of applying this security method to the existing in-vehicle
CAN network. We identified the limitations in Mulray’s work
[32], improving it to be effective in a real environment. Our
method is more than twice as accurate as the previous research
by Murvay et al. [32], as reflected in the low false positive rate.
Moreover, we tested our method under the same environment
as the actual in-vehicle CAN network. As a result, we conclude
our proposed method is a feasible and effective approach that
can realistically be applied into in-vehicle CAN network.
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